Diminishing Margins
It’s been a real struggle being a Liverpool fan over the past year, but things look like they’re on the up. Finishing outside of the top 4 wasn’t ideal, but perhaps it was a necessary wake-up call to the coaching staff, recruitment team, and senior management that the squad had been allowed to age and grow stale.
We, the fans and the club, are fully aware that we’re operating at a significant disadvantage when you compare us to some of the teams we’re up against. Opposing fans, especially ones from certain fanbases, like to say that we’re just whining or jealous when we state the obvious: that some clubs have the luxury to invest in the best footballers in the world at a scale never-before-seen. It creates a progressively unlevel playing field and reduces competition over time.
But because we’re aware of this, it’s also not an excuse for failure. We realise that we have to work smarter with less resources to even stand a chance to win. The successes and shattered records this team and its passionate leader has achieved over the past 4 years show that, with the right coaching, the “Moneyball” transfer strategy off the pitch can create a winning machine on it.
Failing to qualify for next season’s Champions League is a great example of how much higher the standards are to compete for top 4, let alone win the league, ever since Pep Guardiola moved to Manchester. Make the mistake of taking your foot off the gas, even just a touch and that alone could prove to be your downfall. There’s little room for complacency in a league that has a diminishing margin for error; Liverpool fans know just how nanoscopic that margin can be.
It’s now a sport that unless you have coin purses as deep as the Mariana Trench, you’ll need a lot more wits, and even more luck than your affluent adversaries.
The team didn’t remotely resemble the one we watched in awe just the season before, as they went as close as any team has to winning the quadruple. They lacked intensity, ruthlessness, and determination; just some of the traits one would use to describe a Klopp team.
I’d compare the experience of watching us last season to a scene in Harry Potter; when Professor Dumbledore told Harry to force him to keep drinking the Emerald Potion, aka “The Drink of Despair”. Dumbledore writhed as the potion induced pain, fear, and delirium; which was exactly my reaction after helplessly watching Watford legend Danny Welbeck dink the ball over Joe Gomez and volley it home like prime Zlatan. Pain because of what I just saw, fear because of what I may see next, and delirium because how the hell did it get this bad?
15 days later, it went from bad to worse. Poor Joe and the rest of the team conceded almost a carbon copy goal against the same team, this time in an even more dramatic fashion. As the wise and tactful Dumbledore once said:
We watched Klopp and co. play the same game and concede the same type of goals over, and over, and over again; every performance a gut punch, knocking the wind out of me. How foolish I was to think things would turn around after every defeat. “Our season starts now” was the new “next season is our season”.
The Liverpool of recent seasons rarely looked spiritless and would put up a fight at the very least. Just where did Klopp’s “mentality monsters” go?
World Domination
Over the years, Klopp’s Liverpool evolved from a team that relied on energy and speed to one that is able to be a little more calculative and controlled, and the stats back that up. We see that while the number of passes per game have gradually increased, we had a greater proportion of short passes than medium-to-long passes per game.
This hints at a play style that has become slower and more patient. But that’s not to say that we’re now playing like a Pep team either. In the 20/21 season, we completed 284 short passes per 90 mins, our highest tally since 2017. In comparison, City’s average since 17/18 is 301 short passes per game, with 345 their highest. We went from a team that needed to be explosive to one that probes and tests its opponent for weaknesses, using the experience amassed over the seasons to know precisely when to go for the haymaker.
One thing that has stuck throughout, though, is intensity. So much so that one of Liverpool’s assistant managers, Pep Lijnders, used that as the title of his book.
How often have we seen Klopp celebrate a tackle like a goal scored? That’s the underlying principle that we saw ever since his first game against Spurs away in October 2015. Although the game ended in a goalless draw, the change in the players was already clear to see; the team didn’t shy away from the challenge. As the team harassed and swarmed the enemy, Klopp showed his appreciation by being the de facto cheerleader on the touchline. The result was our first clean sheet in 5 games during which we won just once and conceded 10 goals. We gladly took the nil-nil.
Fast forward a few years to the 19/20 season, Klopp swapped his pompoms for swords as he commanded his world conquerors to the pinnacle of club football. Win after win, trophy after trophy. The unit consisted of cold-blooded, unrelenting assassins; blocking oncoming daggers, countering with speed, and slicing the enemy until they were forced to accept death by a thousand cuts. They were almost as likely to beat you by 4+ goals than by 1. Victory was the bare minimum and there was no allowance for mercy, not after finishing 2nd with 97 points and 1 defeat the season before. This is what it takes to win the Premier League now.
We now hold the record for being the earliest team to win the Premier League in terms of games remaining, with 7 to spare. Herr Klopp achieved what he’d set out to do during his first press conference as Liverpool manager: win the title within his first four seasons. Evolution complete.
We conquered all of Europe, never stopped, and won the f*ckin’ lot.
However, even though this team won twenty-six of the first twenty-seven games that season, in my opinion, I think its predecessor was, and still is, Klopp’s masterpiece.
The 18/19 Liverpool team was the quintessential Jürgen Klopp team, and even better than the almost-quadruple-winning 21/22 team too. Don’t believe me? Have a look for yourself:
At a glance, we can already see that the 18/19 defensive stats stand out. We had the lowest goals conceded (0.58) and xGA (0.76) per game, we tackled just about everyone, we won almost every other tackle, we dispossessed our opponents, limited their key passes and take-ons against us. Brick wall.
"I don’t like winning with 80 per cent (of possession). Sorry that is not enough for me. Fighting football, not serenity football, that is what I like. What we call in German 'English'— a rainy day, heavy pitch, 5-5, everybody is dirty in the face and goes home and cannot play for the next four weeks." - Klopp
The data also illustrates the boys’ ruthlessness in front of goal, as we managed to do more with less (seems to be a common theme). Even though our total shots per 90 (14.9) that season ranked last out of the 6 seasons in the table below, we recorded our highest goals scored (2.26) and xG (1.94) per 90. We also overachieved our expected goals by 0.32 (Goals - xG), scored more goals per shot than expected (0.14 goals/shot vs. 0.12 npxG/shot), and missed less big chances (54). A key thing to note as well is the relatively high number of goals our midfielders were chipping in with — crucial to have in a title race.
But my favourite set of stats above all, is that while Guardiola’s City get the praise given their success, dominance and near-perfection, his overall City head-to-head record against Klopp’s Liverpool, in all competitions, currently reads as follows:
20 games played, 7 wins, 5 draws, 8 defeats.
Based on Transfermarkt’s transfer expenditure data since 16/17:
Total transfer expenditure: Klopp €754,500,000 - €1,240,000,000 Guardiola
Total number of games won against the other: Klopp 8 - 7 Guardiola
Cost per win against the other (i.e. how much money one required to beat the other):
Klopp €94,312,500 - €177,142,857 Guardiola
If not for you know who doing you know what, this team would’ve been recognised as the greatest in English football history and its war heroes should be lauded more than they currently are. They were 11 millimetres away from the Premier League and Champions League double without. losing. a. single. league. game.
If you regard Pep’s City as the greatest of its generation, or even of all time, you wouldn’t be foolish to think that. Instead, you’d be wrong. Klopp’s first complete iteration of Liverpool were objectively better. The numbers don’t lie.
Parting of the Red Sea
The reason I mentioned the 18/19 team is that one can’t fully grasp how much we fell off last season before understanding the level of expectation fans have of this team.
Defensively, where do I start?
The once frightening and domineering defensive unit whimpered its way to 5th place. We would’ve been much lower if not for the heroics of Alisson Becker.
Question. What’s one of the most demoralising experiences as a player?
Being unable to beat your marker over and over again.
As demonstrated, intensity has been a keystone of the way we play; you can’t be afraid to make tackles and it’s imperative to stop attacks as close to the source as possible.
But we failed to do that.
By not disrupting attacks early enough, it led to us conceding more shots (9.6), goals (1.2), and much higher quality chances (1.34 xGA) to our opponents per 90 than before.
Where do these attacks originate and how do they keep getting through so easily? Why did our xGA jump by nearly half a goal per game? A look at our pressing intensity gives us some valuable insight.
How does one calculate or measure the intensity of a team’s press? An advanced metric referred to in football analytics is Passes Per Defensive Action, aka ‘PPDA’. If you’re curious to learn more about it, I’d recommend checking out this article. PPDA is essentially a metric that measures, on average, how many passes a team allows the opposition to make before they make a defensive action (e.g. successful and unsuccessful tackles, interceptions, and fouls). If Team A has a lower PPDA than Team B, it would suggest that Team A presses with more intensity than Team B. However, it’s important to have the right context when using PPDA to come to an accurate conclusion about a team’s pressing intensity.
Liverpool under Klopp have always been known to be amongst the hardest pressers. Before last season we consistently ranked within the top two teams with the lowest PPDA. So, did Liverpool’s PPDA increase last season? Yes, but not by as much as you’d think. According to The Analyst, we had a 9.9 PPDA in 21/22, which was the lowest in the league. The following season, our PPDA increased to 10.4, which is still good enough for third lowest. It doesn’t really seem like much; what’s half a pass anyway? This is where the context comes in handy.
“If you win the ball back high up the pitch and you are close to the goal, it is only one pass away from a really good opportunity most of the time. No playmaker in the world can be as good as a good counter-pressing situation.” - Klopp
Klopp deploys a high press to easily and swiftly create high quality chances. Data also shows that we completed less high presses last season (368) than the one before (443). Naturally, this led to less shot (52 vs. 71) and goal (4 vs. 7) ending sequences that were started by a high press. This was odd, because we spent a larger proportion of the season being in a losing position than the one before. Common sense would tell us that, in a close game, a trailing team are more likely to press high than a team defending a lead, because they’d be the ones pushing harder to score whereas the other is more likely to cede territory and absorb pressure. Liverpool 21/22 were obviously dominant, spending 49% of duration of the league in the lead, 44% level, and only 7% trailing. Yet, this team who spent almost half of the season protecting a lead rather than chasing one, pressed harder than a team that were trailing for almost a quarter of the season.
2021/22:
2022/23:
The squad aggregate data shows that we’re pressing less intensely as a whole, but some players press more than others. Teams usually have a player or situation act as a “trigger” for a high press. If the trigger is a player, then they’re responsible for deciding when their team will push up in a coordinated high press. For us, our pressing trigger is usually one of our central midfielders pushing up to support the front three.
For large parts of last season the battle scars started to show. It looked like Henderson and Fabinho were second-best to everything, and the criticism followed. But was it justified? Before I dig into the numbers, I feel compelled to say that I have the utmost respect for them because of the blood, sweat, and tears they’ve shed over the years just to help us satisfy our unwavering thirst for entertainment and joy.
But all good things must come to an end. Below is a comparison of their 18/19 (prime) and 22/23 (subprime) per 90 defensive stats using data provided by Opta.
The problem is immediately clear: we need a time machine to bring back 18/19 Fabinho. For 4 seasons, Anfield had a gravitational anomaly in the centre of the pitch. Regardless of whether the ball was on the ground or in the air, it always seemed to be attracted to him. There’s a reason why Klopp’s nickname for him is Dyson.
22/23 Fabinho was a shadow of his former self. He was not contesting in as many duels (12.5 vs. 8.6), especially aerial ones (4.3 vs. 1.8). He also performed worse in ground duels, with less duels contested (8.2 vs. 6.8), duels won (4.4 vs. 3.3), and he was more likely to lose a duel than win one (47.5%).
What you might’ve also noticed is Henderson’s drop off. His role in midfield differs from Fabinho’s; while Fab is more of a reliable ball-winning specialist, Hendo’s the engine of the team and does a bit of everything. Consequently, his defensive stats were never going to stand out in contrast to Fab’s.
All of their metrics experienced a dip, bar interceptions and ball recoveries (we didn’t have as much of the ball than before). The drop off that both Hendo and Fab experienced last season forced Thiago to pretty much be a one-man midfield. The poor guy contested almost as many duels as the other two combined, won just as many aerial duels as a guy 16cm taller than him, all the while trying his best to be the orchestrator of a semi-coherent offence. Intensity? More like indifference.
So we were not contesting in as many challenges in key areas as before; our opponents had little to do in order to part the red sea. Now, to (self) sabotage the defence.
I remember hearing some commentators make the point that Liverpool shouldn’t be playing with a high line, because it seemed to be how most of our opponents’ chances were created. Defending with a high line is risky, because it leads to a ton of space in behind for our opponents to exploit. A classic way to exploit space in behind is the counter attack.
Things are starting to become clearer now. Our high line failed to catch as many players offside each game, meaning counters were an extremely effective method of offence to use against us. If successful, a counter attack usually ends with a shot in the opponent’s penalty box; the most valuable real estate on a football pitch.
When defending, the aim is not necessarily to always prevent the opponent from shooting, although that’d be preferable. Most of the time, it’s a game of probability. The game is simple: you pack the areas of the pitch that give your opponent a high chance to score, i.e., your penalty box. If you stop shots from inside the box and “allow” the other team to shoot from elsewhere, your xGA should be relatively low.
For example, Sean Dyche pretty much pulled off a miracle when his Burnley finished 7th during the 17/18 season to qualify for the Europa League. How did they pull it off? By suffocating their opponents in the penalty box (not literally though).
Dyche instructs his players to stay within the width of the penalty box while defending in their own half, or protecting the “V”. The aim is to give opponents as little time and space as possible in dangerous areas. The maestro himself explains it in more detail in the video below.
Below are some of Burnley’s defensive stats from that season that I think helped propel them into European football, and the corresponding ranking for each one.
Burnley massively overperformed defensively by conceding less goals per 90 (1) than expected (1.35). This gap (-0.35) was only bettered by Man United (-0.39) that season. Unlike United who were lucky to have prime David De Gea in goal, Burnley’s was down to excellent defensive game planning and execution.
As mentioned earlier, sometimes when defending you have to force the attacker to take a bad shot if you can’t prevent the shot from being taken in the first place. Burnley conceded the second most shots per game (14.9), but their opponents were scoring less goals per shot, because they were either coming from an average of 18.6 yards out (further than the edge of the box) and/or… blocked. As you can also see, the data suggests Burnley were also very passive in defence with relatively low number of opponents caught offside, interceptions made, players tackled, and goals conceded from counters - staying true to Dyche’s principles of being compact and protecting vulnerable areas.
Now I’m not saying that we should start playing like Burnley. All I’m saying is that it’s common sense to protect the areas where it’s easiest for your opponents to score. There are multiple ways to do that.
I will now show you why Liverpool didn’t just fail to make it hard, but we actually made it easier for our opponents to score.
And there we have it, our confirmation. Our lack of pressing intensity plus the failure of our back line to play the offside trap ensured that Alisson had many busy evenings. I shudder with horror just imagining what our season would’ve been like without him.
The per game numbers speak for themselves: more opposition through balls, passes into the final third and penalty area, carries into the final third and penalty area, and key passes (passes that lead directly to a shot) completed. It all culminates into a higher proportion of shots conceded within the box.
We lost control from the moment we failed to trigger the press properly.
Unlike in 17/18, when we found out that two goalkeepers weren’t better than one, our 20/21 and 22/23 seasons were plagued with injuries, causing us to overplay some players and to play them out of position at times. By April 2023, the damage to our season was already too severe; there were 12 games left and we were 7 points off fourth having played 2 games more. We’d have had to pull off yet another miracle to make the promised land. Liverpool players, up to that point of the season, missed the most cumulative matches through injuries. The next best was Chelsea with 38 games less.
But we only have ourselves to blame for our deficiencies.
Last season’s defence was our worst with Alisson in goal. We made errors leading to shots, but more importantly, we were conceding a greater proportion of shots from inside the penalty area since 17/18. Our opponents found it easier as they had the highest shot accuracy (42%) and goals per shot (0.12) against us than over the previous 5 seasons.
Our saving grace was Alisson and it’s no secret. The ‘Post shot xGA’ (PSxGA) metric refers to the probability a shot taken will be a goal based on how likely the goalkeeper is to save the shot, and its corresponding +/- value compares the PSxGA against the number of actual goals conceded. The PSxGA value represents if a team over (positive) or underperformed (negative) defensively after every shot. A positive value means that either you’re really lucky or you have a goalkeeper with above-average shot stopping ability. Luck certainly wasn’t on our side last season. Not only did Alisson put up his best numbers (he missed the last game — his +/- is actually +0.27 per 90), he did so while making the most saves per game (2.9) in his Liverpool career. Based on the PSxGA +/- metric, he was the best goalkeeper in Europe’s top 5 leagues last season.
That’s why I shudder.
These were the main problems that contributed to our decline. So how do we fix them?
First Principles
Near the beginning of last season, Klopp talked of “going back to the basics” when we found ourselves struggling for form. I think that he was referring to what we found out above; that pressing is the ticket to get into the first XI.
Liverpool need to find players who are hungry and determined to get one of those 10 tickets (Alisson has a VVIP ticket already), and they already have. We’ve managed to not just get one, but two fearless technicians.
I introduce to you: Alexis Mac Allister and Dominik Szoboszlai.
Alexis and Szobo are most likely vying for the two No. 8 positions just behind the front three, so here’s a comparison against the other midfielders who I think are likely to challenge for the same spots next season: Henderson, Jones, and Elliott.
Alexis looks like he’d be a constant nuisance for the opposition in the air and on the ground, but a worrying observation is the relatively low number of aerial duels Szobo wins given his 6’1” stature. This needs to see an improvement.
Special mention goes to Curtis Jones. The lad recently put in a man of the match performance in the final of the Under-21 Euros, and was also named in the team of the tournament. He’s had a difficult last couple of seasons with two unfortunate injuries forcing him to miss 21 games during an important development period of his career. However, since our switch to the new system, he has taken his game to another level and it looks like the left-sided 8 role might suit him perfectly. On the whole, I’d say that based on the prerequisite of intensity, Alexis, Szobo, and Jones are in the queue. 3 remain, 2 eliminated.
Unfortunately, 3 doesn’t go into 2. For the next round, let’s compare their passing abilities.
Pretty even, I’d say. Nothing really stands out too much other than Szobo’s promising crossing capabilities which would be really interesting to see how we utilise it along with Trent down the right flank. Our boy Curtis is also still impressing.
Alexis’ passing data is slightly skewed, since he started the season in a deeper role than the one he played in after the World Cup. Potter and De Zerbi initially used him in a double pivot with Caicedo to be more involved in the first phase of buildup. After the World Cup, De Zerbi then shifted him to a role akin to his at Argentina.
Playing more advanced allowed him to create more chances and assists, but because he only spent half of the season in that position his numbers are slightly misleading. It’s also why his number of backward passes per game were lower, whereas forward passes were higher than the other two who spent more time playing further up.
“He has the quality to score. Before the World Cup, I used him in a midfield position, with responsibility to build the play. Now he’s higher, and I think higher he can help us to find the last pass, to find goals, because he knows very well that position.” - De Zerbi
Since there are still no standout winners yet, we enter our final round: goalscoring.
DING DING DING!
We have our winners! Congratulations to Messrs Alexis Mac Allister and Dominik Szobo Curtis Jones? Why the hell did we just spend 70 million then?
Well, remember when I said Jones was injured for a while? He only played 18 league games last season. It’s a small sample size, but the data is still valuable because it validates what we also saw with our own eyes. He performed impressively in the new role, especially in terms of goal scoring. Nonetheless, it’s entirely unsustainable to maintain a 50% conversion rate and 83% shot accuracy over a whole season. I mean I rate the lad, but he’s no Divock Origi:
On the balance of things, it looks like Mac Allister gets a ticket into the team due to his work rate, intelligence, and ability to provide goal contributions. I think he’ll slot right into the starting XI at the start of next season, not only because of his stats, but because he already has experience playing in the league and is more developed than the other two.
However, he’ll also most likely take up the left-sided 8 spot that Jones was occupying at the end of last season; it was Alexis’ role for Brighton. Can Jones adapt to play on the right side? I think he has the potential to do so, but it remains to be seen and it will take time to fine-tune. I expect that he’ll play a bigger role next season, because Klopp can’t afford to risk losing him if he doesn’t give Curtis the game time he deserves. Personally, I’d use him as a rotation option for both left and right-sided 8’s (perhaps start in most Europa games), as well as some time playing in a deeper midfield role like he did for England at the Euros. I believe he has the potential to be a starter for us in the future, but for now, this train’s full.
Naturally, that means the right-sided spot goes to our new friend Dominik, and with good reason. He spent last season playing as a right-sided attacking midfielder for RB Leipzig and contributed with 6 goals and 8 assists in the Bundesliga. The lack of goals and assists from midfield were a major problem for us as we were over-reliant on Salah, Trent, and Robbo to do the heavy lifting.
His player profile indicates that he’s more than just goal contributions, though. He’s a well-rounded player that’s also comfortable with the ball at his feet, can take people on, and puts in a shift on top of that. Also according to FBref, his performances over the last year were similar to the likes of Julian Brandt, Bruno Fernandes, and Federico Valverde. Let’s have a look:
Albeit in an “easier” league, Szobo looks like he had arguably the better statistical season compared to Fernandes’ and Valverde’s. It again looks like he’s a well-rounded player with no glaring weaknesses (apart from the aerial contests), and I think that’s why Klopp welcomed his arrival with open arms. At just 22, he’s far from the finished product, but I think he has the potential and the opportunity to become one of the stars of the future.
It’s almost certainly the case that Mac Allister will be a starter for us next season (*knock on wood*), and it’s also likely that Szobo (*knocking on wood intensifies*) will be joining him in the first XI. Their data suggests that they can be the new and improved pressing triggers that’ll replace the ones that showed signs of heavy wear and tear last season. However, I wouldn’t be surprised if Jones gets a few starts here and there due to his familiarity with the team and system. Also aged 22, he has a lot more development to go, but if he keeps playing like he deserves to start then they will come.
To Do, or Not to Do More With Less
I’m excited to watch Alexis and Szobo play for us next season and at this moment I’m convinced that they will help to make us a better team than last season. But it feels like something’s still missing. I think two more signings would perfectly set us up for a title charge next season; signings to really make a statement of intent. The aim isn’t to just get back into the top 4, the aim is to win the title and to prove that last season was just a blip.
Unfortunately, with the signings of Alexis and Szobo completed we only have 1 non-homegrown spot remaining that we’re allowed to fill in order to comply with the Premier League’s homegrown rules. Hence, unless we pay the English player tax to sign a homegrown player, or sell an existing non-homegrown squad member to make more room, we’ll only be able to sign one more player this window.
Below are the positions I think we still need to address.
Central Defender
At first, it may not appear that our centre-back situation is one that we need to pay urgent attention to. We have a world-class one in Van Dijk, a promising one in Konaté, an experienced head in Matip, and a jack of all trades in Gomez. All of whom have been there and done that.
However, I think this is a department that we need to make a signing for this summer, and if we don’t, it’d show that we didn’t learn our lesson not once, but twice, that an injury crisis can quickly snowball and derail a season before it even begins.
Konaté, Matip and Gomez have frequent traveller passes to the treatment room while Virgil just turned 32 and had that ACL injury not long ago. Matip is no spring chicken either. Cumulatively, they missed 30 games through injuries alone in all competitions last season. The constant chopping and changing of the team selection prevents us from forming a solid and reliable centre-back partnership that all elite teams require.
The priority should be a first-team ready centre-back that’s comfortable playing on the left of a back three to replace Robbo in our presumed 3-box-3 formation for next season. The unfortunate side-effect of the system change is that while one full-back thrives in being unshackled, the other is stuck in an unnatural position that isn’t suited for their traits.
Robbo’s contributions to the team cannot be understated; his technical abilities and work rate allowed us to play the way we did. There’s definitely still a space for him in the team, because he’s part of the squad’s leadership group and I think we won’t always be playing the newly-adopted system and may revert to our 4-3-3 or something else if it makes sense.
Josko Gvardiol is probably one of the most sought after centre-backs on the mar— oh, City are targeting him….
Moving on then.
It’s highly unlikely that we’ll get Gvardiol since it’d probably require one too many zeroes to be written on the cheque for John’s liking to get him. So, using The Analyst’s player comparison tool, I tried to see if there’s a player out there that can do the same things Gvardiol can, but at a more affordable price.
A few familiar names, although I doubt Shaw will be joining us any time soon. Using Nathan Aké as an additional benchmark for the level we’d expect in a player playing for us in this position, let’s see how their most recent seasons compared.
Between the 3 options, Hincapié scores better in terms of winning duels and other types of defensive actions. His passing isn’t spectacular, but it’s because it’s related to his position. The graphic below shows the positions he played for Bayer Leverkusen last season.
Hincapié played predominantly as a left back, although it must be noted that his natural position is centre-back.
Xabi Alonso deservedly received praised when he turned around Leverkusen’s fortunes last season. When he joined, the team were performing well below expectations and as a result were 19th. Xabi breathed new life into the team and turned them into one of the best counter-attacking teams in Europe. At the end of the season, they finished 6th and narrowly lost to Jose Mourinho’s Roma in the Europa League semi-finals. One of Xabi’s favourite formation to use? A 3-4-3 that has an uncanny resemblance to a 3-box-3 formation.
While Hincapié played mostly at left back instead of centre-back in that formation, it shows that he’s more than capable in playing different roles. It’s also going to be very useful experience to have in the 3-box-3 formation as the left-sided centre-back is also the left back, assuming the right back is the one inverting into midfield.
Plus, versatility never hurt anybody. Today’s game has trended towards how a team can best utilise the advantage of being versatile. Defenders are moving into midfield during buildup, and even Joelinton went through his own extreme makeover; transforming himself from being a striker that gets more yellow cards than goals, to being the 21st-most prolific tackler in the league last season (I’m not kidding).
Having players with the skills and traits to play multiple roles well is extremely important not only in terms of having the best tactics or winning games, it also helps in squad rotation to keep as many people fit for the entire season.
Hincapié looks like he has the tools and experience to be a success for us. He’s got plenty of years until he reaches his peak but has already played 2 seasons of top-tier football. It’ll take some time to adapt to the league and the team, but he looks first-team ready now, if not very soon.
There’ll of course be questions of whether he can adapt quickly enough to the physical demands of the Premier League, and yes, there’s a lot of frame yet to be filled.
The other caveat is the price; his impressive displays last season earned him a contract extension in February of this year, keeping him at the club until 2027. It’ll take an attractive offer to persuade Leverkusen into selling him. Still, stranger things have happened. Like when El Pistolero signed a contract extension for us in December 2013, only to go to the World Cup in the summer of 2014 and never come back.
His market value according to Transfermarkt is 35 million euros.
Come on Jürgen, do it.
Central Midfielder / Defensive Midfielder
Sigh… this is going to be hard. I was actually planning on writing about someone entirely different for this part. I was going to write about a largely under the radar player that could’ve been a risk worth taking, assuming no more midfield departures. I was so proud of who I’d uncovered that I wanted to showcase this uncut gem to you all, but, alas, it looks like Fabinho will leave for Al-Ittihad this summer. It’s a hard one to stomach to be honest. We’ve adored him ever since the day he joined. He was our tireless, tenacious titan in midfield for 4 years. He rarely gave less than a 7/10 performance with 10/10 effort, even admirably filling in at centre-back during a time of crisis. Yes, he struggled a lot last season, but there’s only so much selfless sacrifice one man can take for years on end. I only wish him the best.
The effect the loss of Fabinho would have on the team will be huge, because we’d be losing a talented, loyal, and selfless player and person. Whoever has the unfortunate task to replace him has big shoes to fill notwithstanding last season.
Without Fabinho leaving, I think it would’ve been fine if we had either made a signing for the future, or none at all if the right deal wasn’t to be found. With him leaving, we need to get a first-team calibre defensive midfielder as well, because the only other one we have is 18 year-old Stefan Bajcetic.
Losing Fabinho means we have to try to find a replacement with the capability to be just as much of a menacing presence in midfield that can reliably win the ball back in a variety of ways. We’ve been linked with Roméo Lavia, Manu Koné, and Khéphren Thuram in recent weeks. I say none of them would be an adequate replacement for Fabinho. I believe there’s an even better option, and no, it’s not Moisés Caicedo nor Aurélien Tchouaméni.
Haaaave you met Boubakary?
Some of you might remember hearing his name at some point last season; he was Leicester’s starting defensive midfielder.
“What?? You want us to sign a defensive mid that just played in a team that ended up getting relegated, and you expect him to be ready for our level?”
Then why are teams drooling over Roméo Lavia?
Boubakary is a little older than Lavia, but remember, we need someone who can come in and swiftly slot into a team whose minimum expectation is to compete for the title.
What some of you might not know, is that Boubakary is already a champion. He was part of the 20/21 Lille team that shocked the whole of France as Lille beat PSG to their first title since Eden Hazard was there in 10/11. His performances during that season were what convinced Brendan Rodgers to bring him to England.
I went ahead and compared his stats from that season to the other guys mentioned above, as well as prime Fabinho as the benchmark.
It’s uncanny, isn’t it? His stats from that season are so similar to prime Fabinho’s.
At just 21, Boubakary produced a season like that to help his team upset another that had the likes of Mbappé and Neymar within their ranks.
As mentioned, Leicester were relegated last season so this presents a good opportunity for us to sign someone who we know is hugely talented and doesn’t deserve to be playing in the Championship.
He already has Premier League experience and he already knows what it feels like to be in a title race. His current market value according to Transfermarkt is 20 million euros. To me, it’s almost a no-brainer.
Those are the two signings I think would prepare us for a strong title charge next season. I’m willing to bet the boys can’t wait to get back out there.
We’ve had an exciting start to the transfer window already, but hopefully there are still at least a couple more signings to go. This summer is important because we can’t get it wrong. If we do, missing out on the Champions League for two consecutive seasons may be what proves to be the downfall of Klopp and his empire.